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This paper extends impossibility theorems of Arrow and others to cases in 
which social comparisons between alternatives in a set X of social alternatives 
may be made only for each pair {x, y} in a certain subset of distinct pairs taken 
from X. With E the set of pairs within which social comparisons may be made, 
G = (X, E) is an undirected graph without loops. The social comparison 
between x and y  for {x, y} E E is to be based on the preferences of individuals 
in a linite society S. Each individual is presumed to prefer x to y  or prefer y  
to n (not both) for every {x, y} E E and may hold any preference relation that 
does not cycle in G. A profile is an assignment of one such relation to each 
individual in S. The paper examines binary social comparison procedures 
which map each protile into a social preference relation over the pairs in E, sub- 
ject to x socially preferred to y  whenever {x, y} E E and everyone in S prefers x 
to y. Individual i E S is a dictator [weak dictator] on {x, y} E E if f  x is socially 
preferred to y  [x ranks as high as y  socially] whenever i prefers x to y, and 
similarly with x and y  interchanged, regardless of the preferences of the other 
individuals in S. An individual is a dictator [weak dictator] on a subgraph of 
G if f  he is a dictator [weak dictator] on every edge in the subgraph. Under 
each of three ordering conditions on social preferences, there is a dictator 
or weak dictator on every block of G which has three or more points, different 
blocks can have different dictators, and bridges in E need not have dictators. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout this paper G = (X, E) is an undirected graph with point 
set X and edge set E. The set E can be any subset of pairs {x, v> from X 
with x # y. Points in X are interpreted as decision alternatives or political 
candidates or other things of concern to a finite group S of individuals. 
The “individuals” may be voters, committee members, competition judges, 
or interest groups. The presence of {x, y} in E is interpreted to mean that 
x and y may face each other in an evaluative comparison by the “society” 
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S or that the individuals in S may be required to make a social choice 
between x and y. In some contexts, parliamentary rules or constitutional 
structures may forbid or obviate the appearance in E of certain pairs 
from X. With X a set of potential candidates in a general election, E might 
not contain any pair of candidates who belong to the same political 
party. 
The task of the paper is to relate structural features of G to certain 
aggregation methods which base social choices from pairs in E on 
preferences of the individuals in S. It is primarily motivated by 
“impossibility theorems” due to Arrow [l], Murakami [6], Schick [8], 
Mas-Cole11 and Sonnenschein [5], and Fishburn [3]. All but the last of 
these assume that E = {{x, y>: x, y E X and x # y}, in which case the 
individuals in S might be called on to decide socially between any two 
distinct alternatives. The paper by Fishburn [3] relaxes this assumption 
by using a bipartite structure in which X is the union of disjoint sets 
Xi and X2 , with {x, JJ} E E whenever x and y are in different Xi . The 
general case examined here allows E to be any set of distinct pairs from X. 
As is true in the cited papers, our general results are somewhat “negative.” 
We shall see that, for a class of binary-comparison social choice methods 
which are required to produce a type of “ranking” of the alternatives in X 
for each profile of individuals’ preferences, there is an individual in S 
who dictates social preferences on each block of G which has three or 
more points. Different blocks can have different dictators, but each bridge 
in E need have no dictator. For example, social preferences on bridges 
determined by simple majority from individuals’ preferences are consistent 
with the conditions used in the analysis. 
The basic formulation for the paper is presented in the next section 
where we identify the general class of binary social choice rules used in 
the analysis. Section 3 then discusses three versions of social ordering or 
ranking, defines the notions of dictators and weak dictators on edges and 
subgraphs, and states the main theorems. Proofs are outlined in the final 
three sections. The remainder of this introduction identifies some defi- 
nitions and results used later. Additional information on these aspects 
can be obtained from works on graph theory, such as [4]. 
In this paper, H = (X’, E’) is a (generated) subgruph of G = (X, E) 
if and only if X’ C X and E’ is the set of all pairs in E whose points are in X’. 
The subgraph H is connecied iff there is a path between every two distinct 
points in H. A block (or lobe graph [7]) of G is a maximal connected 
subgraph H = (X’, E’) of G such that, for every x E X’, the subgraph 
with point set X’ - {x} is connected. An edge {x, y} in E is a bridge (or 
separating edge [7]) iff every path between x and y contains edge {x, JJ]. 
Every edge in E is in exactly one block of G. 
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A circuit in G is a sequence of edges ((x,, , x1}, {x1, x2> ,..., {x,-~, x,}, 
bn 9 x,,}) from E with all xi distinct and m > 2. An edge in E is a bridge iff 
it is not in a circuit. Every two distinct edges in a block of G which has 
three or more points lie on a common circuit. 
Figure 1 illustrates these concepts. There are six blocks, each enclosed 
by a dashed oval. The two bridges of G are {a, b} and {b, c>. Note that every 
edge is in exactly one block, but some points (i.e., cut points) are in two 
or more blocks. The conditions in the theorems presented later imply that 
there is a dictator on each of the four blocks which have three or more 
points (i.e., those which have circuits). If the society S contains four or 
more individuals, then there can be a different dictator on each of these 
four blocks. 
2. PREFERENCES AND CHOICE RULES 
Each individual in S will be assumed to have a definite preference 
between x and y for every (x, v} E E such that these preferences do not 
cycle on any circuit in G. Thus, if ({x0 , x1}, {x1 , x2} ,..., {x, , x0}) is a 
circuit in G, then no individual prefers x1 to xi+1 for i = O,..., m - 1, 
and also prefers x, to x0 . Since we shall assume that the social choice 
between x and y depends solely on preferences between x and y, indi- 
viduals’ preferences in pairs not in E are irrelevant, and hence will not 
be considered. Our proscription on individual indifference between x 
and y for (x, JJ} E E actually yields a generalization of prior impossibility 
theorems which allow indifference since it restricts the domain of individual 
preference relations. Let 
A = {all asymmetric binary relations > on X which satisfy 
x>yory>xiff(x,y}EE,forallx,yEX,andwhichdonot 
cycle on any circuit in G}. 
Thus, the preference relation of each individual i E S is assumed to be in A. 
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The restrictions imposed on relations in A imply that each > E A is 
included in some linear order (asymmetric, transitive, complete) on X. 
This follows from the facts that the transitive closure of > E A is a strict 
partial order and that every strict partial order on X is included in some 
linear order [lo]. 
With 
F = {all functions3 S -+ A}, 
F is the set of individual preference pro$les that we shall work with. A 
profile f~ F assigns a preference relation in A to each individual in S. 
Withf(i) the relation in A assigned to individual i by profilef, we interpret 
xf(i) y to mean that i prefers x to y. A subprofile is the restriction of a 
profile to a subset X’ 6 X, so that the subprofile off on X’ is obtained 
from f by deleting, for every i E S, all ordered pairs in f(i) whose elements 
are not in X’. A profile f is consistent with a subprofile iE the subprofile 
is a restriction off to some X’ C X. A subprofile can have many consistent 
profiles. We shall use subprofiles extensively in later proofs. 
We now describe the general set of binary social choice rules which is 
used in the analysis. Further restrictions on these rules in the form of 
social ordering conditions will be discussed in the next section. First, let 
B = {all binary relations 2 on X which satisfy x 2 y or y 2 x 
iff {x, v} E E, for all x, y E X}. 
Relations in B will be used to describe social preference-or-inditference 
relations, with x 2 y interpreted as x is “socially as good as” y. The 
relations in B are not required to be asymmetric since ties will be permitted. 
Within the setting developed above, we shall say that r is a binary social 
choice rule if and only if it is a function from F into B. Thus, r assigns a 
relation in B to each profile in F. With r(f) the relation in B assigned to 
profile f, we interpret x r(f) y to mean that x is “socially as good as” y. 
Defining 
XPcf)U iff XWY and not [ Y r(f) xl, 
xp(f) y indicates that x is “socially preferred” to y under f and r. If 
both x r(f) y and y r(f) x, then x and y are “socially indBerent.” In 
voting terminology “social indifference” denotes a tie, and xpcf) y 
signifies that x beats y in a “vote” between the two alternatives. 
Two conditions, which are similar to conditions used by Arrow [l] 
and others, will be imposed on binary social choice rules throughout the 
remainder of this paper. They are, for all f, g E F and (x, r} E E: 
UNANIMITY. Ifx f (i) y for all i E S, then xpcf) y; 
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BINARY INDEPENDENCE. If the subprofies off and g on {x, y) are 
identical, then [x r(j) y Q$ x r(g) y] and [y r(f) x i$y r(g) x]. 
Unanimity says that x beats y whenever all individuals prefer x to y. 
Binary independence, which is similar to Arrow’s condition of “inde- 
pendence of irrelevant alternatives,” says that the social choice on {x, y> 
shall be the same in any two situations in which the individuals’ preferences 
on {x, y} are the same. In other words, if [xf(i) y iff x g(i) y] for all i ES 
then x beats y given fiff x beats y given g, and x ties y givenfiff x ties y 
given g. For notational convenience we let 
R = {all binary social choice. rules r which satisfy unanimity 
and binary independence}. 
One rule in R is the simple majority rule defined by x r(f) y iff the 
number of i in S who have xf(i) y is as large as the number of i in S who 
have yf(i) x. As is well known [2, 91, the strict simple majority relation 
p(f) can cycle on a circuit in G for certain profiles fo F when 1 S 1 > 3. 
Another rule in R is the rule for which individual i is a dictator, defined 
by xpcf) y itI xf(i) y. In this case p(f) cannot cycle since f(i) is acyclic. 
The general idea of the theorems in the next section is that when r E R 
is required to satisfy certain ordering conditions, such as acyclicity of 
p(f) for eachfE F, then dictators will arise on the circuits in G. 
3. SOCIAL ORDERING, DICTATORS AND BLOCKS 
This section explores relationships among social ordering conditions 
imposed on the rules in R, dictators and weak dictators in S, and blocks 
of G. 
Three increasingly restrictive social ordering conditions will be 
examined. Each condition applies to rules r E R and is relative to the 
particular G = (X, E) which underlies the formulation. Thus, for example, 
when xp(f) y or x r(f) y is stated, it is to be understood that {x, y} E E. 
CONDITION 1. p(f) is acyclic for every f E F. 
CONDITION 2. For all {x1 ,..., x,} C X and all f E F, if xt p(f) xi+1 for 
i = I,..., m- l,andzy(x,,x,}~E, thenxlp(f)xm. 
CONDITION 3. For all {x1 ,..., xm} C X and all f E F, if xi r(f) xi+1 
for i = l,..., m - 1, and if(x, , xm> E E, then xl r(f) x,; and ifxz r(f) xi,1 
for i = l,..., m - 1 and qpcf) x6+1 for some i E {l,..., m - l}, and if 
{xl ,x,J E E, then xl pcf> xm . 
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Condition 1, the weakest or most general of the three, says that no 
profile f is allowed to have x,p(f) x1 , xrp(f) x, ,..., xmp(f) x0 . It is 
easily checked that Condition 1 holds for simple majority on three alter- 
natives and four individuals (because individual indifference is not 
allowed), but that Conditions 2 and 3 fail for simple majority in this case. 
Condition 1 is often viewed as a minimal condition for “binary collective 
rationality” since it holds if and only if, for every f~ F and every finite 
subset Y of X, there is at least one element in Y which is beaten by no 
other element in Y. 
Condition 2 requires p(f) to be essentially transitive for each profile J 
It is stronger than Condition 1, which would have x1 r(f) x, in the con- 
clusion rather than x,p(f) x, . Condition 3 says that r(f), the social 
preference-or-indifference relation assigned to f by r, is essentially transitive 
for every profile, and that the conclusion of a transitivity series is strict 
social preference when any r(f) in the series is replaced by p(f). Con- 
dition 3 corresponds to Arrow’s original condition of “collective ratio- 
nality,” as modified for our setting in which social comparisons are not 
required for all pairs from X. 
We now consider two types of dictators for a binary social choice rule 
r E R. Individual i E S is a dictator on {x, y} E E iff xf(i) y * xpcf) y 
and yf(i) x 3 ypcf) x for all profiles f. Individual i is a weak dictator 
[5] on (x, y} E E iff xf(i)~~ =+- xr(f)y and yf(i) x 2 yr(f) x for all 
f E F. Thus a dictator’s preference becomes the social preference, regardless 
of the preferences of the other individuals in S, whereas a weak dictator’s 
preference for x over y requires only that x be “socially as good as” y. 
An individual is a dictator [weak dictator] on a circuit graph C (which 
consists of the points which define the edges in a circuit in G along with 
the edges in the circuit) or a subgraph H of G if and only if he is a dictator 
[weak dictator] on every edge in the circuit or subgraph. 
Our first two theorems involve Conditions 3 and 2, the strongest social 
ordering conditions. 
THEOREM 1. Suppose / S 1 > 0, r E R, and r satis3es Condition 3. 
Then there is a dictator on every block in G which has three or more points, 
dlxerent blocks with three or more points can have dzyerent dictators, and 
there need be no dictator on each bridge in E whenever 1 S 1 > 1. 
THEOREM 2. Suppose 1 S 1 > 0, r E R, and r satisfies Condition 2. 
Then there is a weak dictator on every block in G which has three or more 
points, d@erent blocks with three or more points can have dyerent weak 
dictators, and there need be no weak dictator on each bridge in E whenever 
ISI > 1. 
SOCIAL CHOICE IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 159 
The existence of a dictator or weak dictator on each block with three 
or more points will be proved in the next section. If S has at least two 
individuals, different individuals can be dictators or weak dictators on 
different blocks in G since Conditions 2 and 3 have no real effect except 
on blocks. For example, if HI and Hz are two blocks, if x is a point in HI 
but not H, , and if y is a point in Hz but not HI , then {x, y} 6 E. Cut 
points (points common to two or more blocks, as is c on Fig. 1) do not 
affect the fact that the social ordering conditions operate independently 
within each block. 
If [ S 1 = 1, then unanimity for rule r E R will make the single individual 
a dictator throughout G with p(f) = f(1). If I S I > 1, then the simple 
majority rule applied to bridges in E will satisfy all the conditions of 
Theorem 1 for these edges, and hence they will not have dictators. A 
similar remark applies to weak dictators under Theorem 2 when I S 1 > 2. 
To avoid a weak dictator on a bridge {x, y} when S = { 1,2} we could take 
xp(f) y whenever the two individuals in S have opposite preferences 
between x and y. Note here that the use of simple majority on an edge 
when 1 S 1 = 2 will make each individual a weak dictator on the edge. 
Although there can be at most one dictator on an edge, there may be 
many weak dictators on an edge. For example, suppose r is the unanimity 
rule with xpdf) y iff {x, y} E E and xf(i) y for all i E S: if x f(i) y and 
yfG) x for i, j E S then x and y are “socially indifferent.” Then r satisfies 
all hypotheses of Theorem 2 and every individual is a weak dictator on 
every edge in G. Every member of a standard jury is a weak dictator when 
unanimity is required for a “guilty” or “not guilty” verdict. 
In working with Condition 1, the weakest or most general of the three 
social ordering conditions, we shall use a strong monotonicity condition 
for binary social choice rules which is similar to conditions used by Mas- 
Cole11 and Sonnenschein [5] and Fishburn [3]. Examples show that the 
results obtained in Theorem 3 below are invalid if this condition is deleted 
from the hypotheses of the theorem. 
STRONG MONOTONICITY. Forallf,gEF, all (x,y)EE and all iES: 
if [xf(j) y $7 x g(j) y] and [ yf(j) x ~$7 y g(j) x] for all j # i in S, and 
ifx r(g) Y, Y g(i) x and xf(i) Y, then xp(f) Y. 
Strong monotonicity says that if x is “socially as good as” y under 
profile g when some i E S prefers y to x under g, and if f is obtained from g 
by having i reverse his preference from y over x to x over y with the prefer- 
ences of other individuals unchanged, then x is “socially better than” y 
after the change. Therefore a tie can be broken in favor of one alternative 
when one individual changes his preference in favor of that alternative. 
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In addition, if x “beats” y in one instance then x will continue to “beat” y 
if some individuals change from y over x to x over y and no individual 
makes a reversal from x over y to y over x. 
The following theorem focuses on societies that contain more than three 
individuals. 
THEOREM 3. Suppose / S / > 0, r E R, and r satisfies Condition 1 
and strong monotonicity: 
a. Zf I S I = 4, then there is a weak dictator on every block of G 
which has four or more points, dyerent blocks of G with four or more points 
can have different weak dictators, and there need be no weak dictator on 
each edge in E which is in a block having faver than four points; 
b. if 1 S j > 4, then there is a weak dictator on every block of G 
which has three or more points, diferent blocks of G with three or more 
points can have diflerent weak dictators, and there need be no weak dictator 
on each bridge in E. 
The only difference between / S I = 4 and 1 S 1 > 4 arises for a block H3 
with exactly three points. As noted earlier, when 1 S / = 4, the simple 
majority rule applied to H, satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 3 for I& 
without giving a weak dictator on H3 . An important aspect of this case 
is the fact that individual indifference between distinct alternatives is not 
allowed by the formulation. The paper by Mas-Cole11 and Sonnenschein [5] 
shows that somewhat different results will be obtained if individual 
indifference is allowed in preference profiles. 
4. PROOF PROCEDURE 
Before embarking on the proofs of the specific theorems, we shall outline 
the approach that will be followed in all cases. For each edge {x, y] E E 
and each i E S, define 
x i* y iff xpcf) y whenever f is such that i prefers y to x and 
all other individuals in S prefer x to y. 
Thus x i* y says that the “coalition” S - (i> of all voters except i is 
“decisive” for x,over y in the sense that x defeats y socially whenever all 
individuals in S - {i} prefer x to y and individual i has the opposite 
preference. Next, we define 
x II y iff x p(f) y whenever f is such that n individuals in S prefer 
y to x and all others prefer x to y. 
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Thus x n y if and only if every “coalition” of 1 S I - n voters is “decisive” 
for x over y. By the above, x i* y for all i implies x 1 y. 
The approach taken in the proof of each theorem is a proof by contra- 
diction which proceeds as follows. We shall work with a given circuit or 
a given block. First, if individual i is not a dictator or a weak dictator 
on the edges in a circuit or block with at least a specified number of points, 
it will be shown that x i* y for some edge {x, y> in the circuit or block. It is 
then noted that a i* c and c i* a for every edge {a, c> in the circuit or block. 
Now suppose, contrary to the conclusion of the appropriate theorem that 
no individual is a dictator or weak dictator on a circuit or block of the 
required size. It then follows that a 1 c and c 1 a for every edge {a, c} 
in the circuit or block. 
Using this as the initial step in an induction, we note that 1 S 1 > 1, 
if that was not already presumed by the hypotheses of the theorem. In 
general, with I S 1 > n > 1 and a k c and c k a for all edges in the circuit 
or block and all k ~(l,..., n}, it will be shown that a nfl c and c nfl a 
for all edges, along with 1 S j > n + 1. But this leads to the conclusion 
that S is infinite, which contradicts our supposition that the number of 
individuals is finite. Therefore, some individual in S must be a dictator 
or weak dictator on the circuit or block. 
Slight modifications on the latter part of this proof outline will arise 
later in the proof of Theorem 3, but the general ideas are unchanged. 
Because there are small but important differences in the hypotheses of 
each theorem, different details are required in their proofs. This is especially 
true of Theorem 3, which uses the strong monotonicity condition. The 
basic steps in the proof of Theorem 3 are given in Section 6, which derives 
weak dictators on blocks which contain four or more points, given 
) S ) >, 4, and in Section 7, which establishes the existence of a weak 
dictator on a block having exactly three points, given j S I > 4. Theorems 1 
and 2 are proved in the next section. 
5. PROOF OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2 
Throughout this section it is assumed that 1 S I > 0, the binary social 
choice.rule r is in R, and H is a block of G which contains three or more 
points. 
Theorem 1. It is assumed in this subsection that Condition 3 holds. 
Since no two individuals can be dictators on the same edge of H and since 
each two edges in H lie on a common circuit, it suffices to show that there 
is a dictator on a circuit graph C = ({b, y, x1 ,..., x,}, {{b, x1}, {x1 , x,} ,..., 
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{xm , y}, {y, b})) in H. The existence of a dictator on a circuit graph with 
exactly three points is essentially Arrow’s theorem for three social alter- 
natives [ 1, pp. 97-1001. Since proofs of this case are given also in Fishburn 
[2, pp. 205-2071, we shall assume henceforth that C has at least four points, 
so that m > 2. 
Being concerned only with individual preferences on the edges in C, 
we shall work with subprofiles on (b, y, x1 ,..., xnz} represented by linear 
orders for designated individuais and classes of individuals on this subset 
of X. Recall that a linear order on X is in A and every order in A is included 
in a linear order on X. When we write zlzz . . . z~+~ as the linear order on 
(4 Y,..., G?z> = h ,..., z,,,} for a subset of voters, it is to be understood 
that every voter in the subset prefers q to zlc iff {z, , z~> E E and j < k. 
Because of binary independence, preferences on alternatives not in the 
designated subset do not affect the determination of r relationships on 
the edges in C. 
The expression [i. yx, ... x,b; Others. byxnt 1.. x1] denotes the sub- 
protie which assigns yx, *.a x,b to i ES and assigns byxm a.- x1 to every 
individual in S - (i}. For every profilefthat is consistent with this subpro- 
file (such anfexists), unanimity for r requires yp(f) x, , x,p(f) xmel ,..., 
x,p (f) x1 . When the subprofile in use is clear from the context, f will 
be omitted, as in ypx,px,-,p . ..pxl. 
With these preliminaries at hand we now proceed by the approach 
described in the preceeding section to show that the hypotheses of 
Theorem 1 imply that there is a dictator on C, and hence, on the block 
which contains C. 
Let i be an arbitrary individual in the nonempty set S and suppose that i 
is not a dictator on C. Then there is an edge in C, say {x1, x& for 
definiteness, such that xzf(i) x1 and x1 r(f) x2 for some profile f E F. 
Since unanimity would be violated if i were the only individual, I S 1 > 2. 
Letting x1 and x2 be related as inf, form the subprofile 
[i. xg *.a x, ybx,; Others. b(xl , x2 as inf) x3 ... x, y], (1) 
where bx,x,x, --a for Others who have x,f(j) x2 , and bxzx,x, ... for 
Others who have x, f(k) x1 . Let g be any profde that is consistent with (1). 
Then b p( g) x1 by unanimity, x1 r(g) x2 by x1 r(f) x2 and binary indepen- 
dence, and x,&g) *** p(g) xmp(g) y by unanimity. Thus, with respect 
to (l), bpxlrx2p ..* p x,p y so that bp y by Condition 3. Since i 
is the only voter who prefers y to b in (l), it follows from binary inde- 
pendence that b i* y. Using b i* y, unanimity, Condition 3 (or Condition 2) 
and binary independence, the following subprofiles yield the indicated i* 
conclusions: 
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[i. yx, --- x,b; Others. byxn, *a* x1] 3 b i* x1 
[i. yx, *a- x,b; Others. xlbyx, -es x2] a x1 i* x2 
ii. YX, a** xlb; Others. x,-, *** xlbyxn] * x,-~ i* x, 
Ii. YX, *** xlb; Others. x, **a x,by] * x, i* y. 
For example, the last of these gives x,p *a* p x,p b by unanimity, 
b p y by b i* y, then x, p y by Condition 3 (or Condition 2), and hence, 
x, i* y by binary independence. In a similar way, the use of b i* x1 with 
subprofiles having x1 .*a x, yb for i and, successively, ybx, -*. x, , 
x,ybx, +-a x,.+ ,..., x2 .-. x, ybx, for Others, gives x, i* x,-, ,..., x2 i* xl . 
Finally, using xz i* x1 , then x, i* y, 
[i. xlbyxn. SD* x2 ; Others. yx, *a* x,b] a y i* b, 
[i. ybx, e.0 x, ; Others. x1 **a xmyb] G- x1 i* b. 
Hence, a i* c and c i* a for every edge {a, c} in C. 
Suppose next that no individual in S is a dictator on C. Then, since i 
was arbitrary in the preceding paragraph, a 1 c and c 1 a for all edges in C, 
and 1 S 1 > 1 as noted above. 
Continuing under the no-dictator supposition, suppose I S 1 > n > 1 
and a k c and c k a for all edges in C and all k ~{l,..., n>. Select i E S, 
J C S, 1 J I = n, i $ J and form the subprofile 
[i. x2 *-a x,ybx, ; J. x, -*a x,yb; Others (not in J u {i}). bx, -*a x, y]. 
Then bpx, by bnx,, x,px, by x11x2, and x,p -**px,py by 
unanimity. Hence, bp y by Condition 3 (or Condition 2). Since this 
contradicts unanimity if / S I = n + 1 with Others empty, it follows that 
1 S I > n + 1. Moreover, by cycling the orders in (2) and using duals of (2) 
and its cycled counterparts, and by noting that i ES and JC S can be 
chosen as we please subject to 1 J [ = n and i $ J, it follows that a (n+l) c 
and c (n+l) a for all edges in C. Since a 1 c and c 1 a for all edges in C, 
it follows that 1 S I > IZ for all II E {1,2,...}. But then S must be infinite 
and the desired contradiction obtains. 
Theorem 2. As noted by the parenthetical references to Condition 2 
in the preceding proof, the only place where Condition 3 was required 
rather than Condition 2 to carry the desired conclusion was in obtaining 
bpy from bpxlrx,p a** p x,p y following (1). Since bp y is needed 
to give b i* y, and hence, to allow the proof to continue, and since bp y 
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cannot be obtained from bp x1 r x,p ... p x,p y under Condition 2 
unless x1 r x2 is replaced by x,p x2 , we use the assumption that i is not 
a weak dictator to permit this replacement. That is, given that i is not a 
weak dictator on C, there is an edge in C, say (x1 , x2}, such that xzf(i) x1 
and xlpcf) x, for some profile J The proof of Theorem 2 then follows 
the proof of Theorem 1 with the indicated changes from x, r(f) x2 to 
xlp(f) x2 and from “dictator” to “weak dictator.” The case of circuits 
with three points is covered in Fishburn [2, p. 2081. 
6. PROOF OF THEOREM 3, PART I 
Throughout this section it is assumed that 1 S 1 > 4, S is finite, r E R, 
and r satisfies Condition 1 and strong monotonicity. In addition, H 
denotes a block of G which has four or more points. We show that some 
i E S is a weak dictator on H. 
With E* the set of all edges in H which are in circuits which have at 
least four edges, the analysis will revolve around the following special 
condition for i E S. 
CONDITION 4(i). For all edges {a, c} in E* and all f~ F, [af(i) c and 
af(j) c for some j # i] * a r(f) c, and [cf(i) a and cf(j) a for some 
j#i]=>cr(f)a. 
After showing that Condition 4(i) implies that i is a weak dictator on H, 
it will be proved that the denial of the condition for each i E S contradicts 
the finiteness of S. 
Suppose Condition 4(i) holds. Then, when {a, c} E E*, strong mono- 
tonicity implies ap c whenever i and two or more other individuaIs in S 
prefer a to c. Let C be an arbitrary circuit graph in H with four or more 
points, and with edges {b, x1}, {x1, x2} ,..., {x, , y}, and (y, b}. Since 
1 S 1 > 4, select j and k in S distinct from i and form the subprofile 
[i. bx, **- x,y; j. ybx, *a* x, ; k. xmybxl -** x,-~ ; Others. x1 ... x,yb]. 
Then bpx,, x~-~Px~, and x,p y by the result mentioned earlier in 
this paragraph, and x1 p a** p x,-~ by unanimity. Hence, b r y according 
to Condition 1. Binary independence and strong monotonicity show that 
i is a weak dictator for b over y. The dual subprofile (invert all orders) 
shows that i is a weak dictator for y over b. Since any edge in C other than 
(b, y} could have been used as the pivotal edge, i is a weak dictator on C. 
Since C could be any circuit graph in H with more than three points, 
Condition 4(i) implies that i is a weak dictator on all edges in E*. Now 
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suppose there are edges in H which are not in E*. Letting (a, b} be such 
an edge, it is readily checked that H must have the form shown in Fig. 2, 
with at least two xI since H has at least four points. Then, with i a weak 
dictator on the edges in E* (i.e., all edges other than {a, b}), the subprofile 
[i. ax,b; j. baxl ; Others. x,ba] gives ap xl and x,p b by i’s weak 
dictatorship and strong monotonicity. Therefore, a r b by Condition 1, 
and independence and strong monotonicity show that i is a weak dictator 
for a over b. Interchange of a and b yields i as a weak dictator for b 
over a. It follows that i is a weak dictator on H. 
When Condition 4(i) fails. Let i be an arbitrary individual in S and 
suppose that Condition 4(i) is false. Then there is a j # i in S, and f E F, 
and an {a, c} E E* such that af(i) c, af(j) c, and cp(f) a. Let C be a 
circuit graph in H which has at least four points and has {a, c} as one of 
its edges. For definiteness, let C have edges {b, x1} ,..., {x, , y}, and {y, b}, 
and take (a, c) = (b, y). Consider the subprofiles 
lW1. bxl *-. x,y; Others. (b and y as in f) x, e-0 xm] 
KW. bxl -a. x,y; Others. x,(b and y as in f) x1 ..a x,-r] 
W,jl. bxl ... x,y; Others. x1 **a x&b and y as in f)]. 
BY (a, 4 = (b, Y), CPU) a, and binary independence, yp b for each sub- 
profile. Unanimity on the fust subprofile gives bp x, p *a- p x, , hence, 
y r x, by Condition 1, hence, y i* x, and y j* x, by strong monotonicity 
and binary independence. In a similar manner the other subprofiles 
give x, i* x,-r and x, j* x,,+~ ,..., x2 i* x1 and x2 j* x, , and x, i* b 
and x, j* b. We now split up i and j and make use of both i* and j* in the 
following subprofiles: 
[i. byxm *** x1 ; j. x, **a xlby; Others. yx, .-- x,b] 
[i. byxm *.- x, ; j. x,byx, a** x2 ; Others. x,,, .** xlby] 
[i. byxm *a* x1 ; j. xlbyxm *** x, ; Others. xK *** xlbyxm a-. xk+J, 
2<k<m, 
[i. byxm-*.xl; j. x, **a x,by; Others. xlbyxm ... x2]. 
FIGURE 2 
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The first of these has y p x, by y j* x,,, , x,p **a p x1 by unanimity, and 
x,p b by x1 i* b, hence y r b by Condition 1, hence y i* b and y j* b by 
strong monotonicity and independence. The second gives x, i* y and 
x, j* y using x1 i* b and x2 j* x1 . The third gives xk i* x~+~ and xk j* x~+~ 
using x1 i* b and x2 j* x1 , and the last yields x1 i* x2 and x1 j* x2 using 
x1 i* .b and y j* x, . Finally, we obtain b i* x1 and b j* x1 from 
[i. x,byx, ..a x2 ; j. x,,, *-a x,by; Others. byxm a.* x,] and b i* y and b j* y 
from [i. x1 ..a x, yb; j. ybx, *a- x, ; Others. bx, **a x, y]. Thus, x i* z, 
z i* x, x j* z, and z j* x for every edge {x, z} in C. 
It follows that i* and j* hold on every edge in H which is in a circuit 
along with {a, c} and at least two other edges. Denote the set of such edges 
by E’. Suppose that some edge in His not in E’, say (g, g’}. Then {a, c} n 
{g, g’} # o since {g, g’} must be in a circuit which contains itself, {a, c}, 
and exactly one other edge. For definiteness let g’ = c, with ({a, c}, 
{c, g}, {g, a}) a circuit in H. Since {c, g} 4 E’, the only way to get from a 
to g when the edge {a, g} is removed is to go through c. In addition, since 
Ia, 4 E E*, one of the two possibilities shown in Fig. 3 must obtain, 
with m > 2 or t 2 1. If the picture on the left of Fig. 3 applies, then 
[i. agcx, a.. x1 ; j. x, *a* x,agc; Others. cx, --- x+g] gives x,p a by 
x,i*a (with {xl,a}EE’), cpx, by cj*x,, and apg and x,p*--px, 
by unanimity. Hence, c r g by Condition 1, and therefore c i* g and c j* g 
by independence and strong monotonicity. The relationships g i* c, 
g j* c, a i* g, a j* g, g i* a, and g j* a are obtained in a similar way. On 
the other hand, if the picture on the right of Fig. 3 applies (note then that 
{a, g} E E’), the subprofile [i. acg; j. cga; Others. gac] gives gp a by 
g i* a, up c by a j* c, hence, g r c by Condition 1, thus leading to g i* c 
and g j* c. The dual profile gives c i* g and c j* g. 
I* 
--._ 
P 
Xrn 
a 
c 
3 
FIGURE 3 
Therefore, the failure of Condition 4(i) leads to x i* y and y i* x for 
every edge in H. Hence, the failure of Condition 4(i) for each i E S implies 
x 1 y and y 1 x for every edge in H. In particular, this is true for every 
edge in a circuit graph C in H which has four or more points. With C 
designated as before, suppose 1 S 1 > n > 1, and that a k c and c k a 
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for all edges in C and all k E {l,..., n}, and select i E S and J C S with 
1 J 1 = n and i .$ J. The subprofile 
[i. bx, a-- x,y; J. ybx, --a x,,, ; Others. x1 e-s x,yb for one of these 
and x2 - *- x, ybx, for the rest] 
gives x2 p -a-px,byunanimity,x,pybyx,,ny,ypbbyylb,andbpx, 
by b 1 x1 or by unanimity if Others is empty. Hence, x2 r x1 by Condition 1. 
If Others is empty, then unanimity is contradicted. Hence, I S 1 > II + 1. 
When x,x, in the special order in Others is inverted, x2p x1 after the 
inversion by strong monotonicity, and, since the selection of i, J, and the 
special individual in Others were arbitrary, x2 (n+l) x1 . In like manner, 
a(n+l) c and c (n+l) a for every edge in C. It follows that S must be 
infinite, a contradiction. 
7. PROOF OF THEOREM 3, PART II 
This section assumes that 1 S 1 > 5, r E R, r satisfies Condition 1 and 
strong monotonicity, and C is a three-point circuit graph in G with point 
set {a, b, c}. The following correspondent of Condition 4(i) will be used 
to show that there is a weak dictator on C. 
CONDITION 5(i). For all edges {x, y} in C and all f E F, [xf(i) y and 
xf(j) y for some j # i] Z- x r(f) y, and [ yf(i) x and yf(j) x for some 
j # il * y r(f) x. 
Suppose first that Condition 5(i) holds. Then, for any x, y E {a, b, c}, 
strong monotonicity implies xp y when i and two or more others in S 
prefer x to y. The subprofile [i. abc; Two others. cab; The rest. bca] 
gives up b and bp c, hence, a r c by Condition 1. Strong monotonicity 
then shows that i is a weak dictator for (a, c) in the sense that a r c when- 
ever he prefers a to c. Permutations on {a, b, c} in the subprofile imply 
that i is a weak dictator on C. Note that 1 S I > 5 is critical here, for it 
insures that “The rest” consists of at least two individuals. 
Suppose now that Condition 5(i) fails. For a definite failure suppose, 
without loss in generality, that j # i, a f(i) b, a f(j) b, and b p(f) a for 
some f E F. The subprofile [{i,j). acb; Others. (a and b as in f) c] gives 
bp a by the assumption just stated, ap c by unanimity, and, therefore, 
b r c by Condition 1. Strong monotonicity and independence then give 
b i* c and b j* c. In a similar fashion, [{i, j}. acb; Others. c(a and b as inf)] 
yields c i* a and c j* a. Then [i. abc; j. cab; Others. bca] gives bp c 
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by b j* c, c p a by c i* a, hence, b r a by Condition 1. Strong monotonicity 
supplies the conclusion that b i* a and b j* a. 
We show next that c i* b and c j* b. To the contrary, suppose these 
do not both hold. Then, since [i. abc; j. bca; Others. cab] has cp a 
by c i* a, we require b r a (since otherwise a p b, then c r b by Condition 1, 
and c i* b and c j* b by strong monotonicity). Interchange of i and j 
in the subprofile leads to 
b r a when [i. ab; j. ba; Others. ab] or [i. ba; j. ab; Others. ub]. (3) 
Secondly, since [{i, j}. abc; Others. cab] gives up b by unanimity, we 
require a r c to prevent c i* b and c j* b. Hence, 
arc when [(i, j}. ac; Others. ca]. (4) 
Next, since [{i, j, k}. acb; Others. cba] gives up c by (4) and strong 
monotonicity, and c p b by unanimity, a r b by Condition 1. Hence, using 
strong monotonicity, 
apb when [{i, j, k, I}. ub; Others. bu]. (5) 
Also, since [i. bat; j. acb; k. cba; Others. ucb] yields bp a by (3) and 
strong monotonicity, and a p c by (4) and strong monotonicity, b r c by 
Condition 1. Hence, using strong monotonicity, 
bpc when [i. bc; {j, k, I}. cb; Others. bc]. (6) 
Finally, consider [i. abc; {j, k, I>. cab; Others. bca]. Then, for this 
subprofile, up b by (5), b p c by (6), and cp a by c i* a, which together 
contradict Condition 1. Hence, it must be true that c i* b and c j* b. 
A similar proof shows that a i* c and aj* c, and the subprofile 
[i. cbu; j. bat; Others. ucb] then gives u i* b and uj* b. Hence, x i* y 
for all six ordered pairs (x, JJ) from {a, b, c} with x # y. 
Suppose, henceforth, that Condition 5(i) fails for every i E S. Then 
x 1 y for all six cases. 
The next step is to show that x 2 y for all six cases. Using the presumed 
failure of Condition 5(i), suppose as before that uf(i) b, af(j) b, and 
b p(f) a for some SE F. This and strong monotonicity (if necessary) give 
bp a for the subprofile [{i, j}. acb; k. cbu; Others. but] which, along 
with a p c by a 1 c (operating on k), yields b r c by Condition 1. Conse- 
quently, using strong monotonicity and independence, 
bpc when two in {i, j, k) prefer c to b and all others prefer b to c. 
(7) 
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Similarly, [i&j}. acb; k. bat; Others. ,cba] gives b p a as before, cp b by 
c 1 b, hence, c r a by Condition 1. Therefore, 
cpa when two in {i, j, k} prefer a to c and all others prefer c to a. 
(8) 
Using (8) and a 1 b, [{i,j}. abc; k. bca; Others. cab] gives 
cpb when two in {i, j, k} prefer b to c and all others prefer c to b. 
(9) 
Then (9) and a 1 c applied to [(i,j}. bat; k. cba; Others. acb] give 
apb when two in {i, j, k} prefer’ b to a and all others prefer a to b. 
(10) 
Likewise, (10) and b 1 c on [{i,j}. bca; k. cab; Others. abc] yield 
apt when two in {i, j, k) prefer c to a and all others prefer a to c. 
(11) 
Finally, (7) and c 1 a on [{i,j). cab; k. abc; Others. bca] give 
bps when two in (i, j, k} prefer (I to b and all others prefer b to a. 
(12) 
Since k in (7)-(12) can be any individual in S - {i,j}, and since a similar 
analysis holds for each i E S, it follows that x 2 y for all six ordered pairs 
(x, y) from {a, b, c} with x # y. 
Proceeding by induction from this point, suppose that n > 2, / S 1 > 
n f2, and xky for the six (x,y) pairs and all kE{1,2,...,n}. With 
(x, y, z) a permutation of (a, b, c), the subprofile 
[Two individuals. zyx; IZ others. yxz; The rest. xzy] (13) 
gives xp z by x 2 z, zp y by z n y, hence, x r y by Condition 1. Strong 
monotonicity gives x p y when one of the first n + 2 individuals in (13) 
inverts yx, and it follows that x (n+l) y for all six (x, y) cases. Moreover, 
x r y for (13) requires / S 1 > 12 + 2. Since the hypotheses of this paragraph 
are true for n = 2, it follows that S must be infinite, and the desired 
contradiction obtains. 
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